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Part Two: Political, Diplomatic and Military Issues
The Japanese Factor in the Sovereignty Issue in the South 
China Sea during the Second World War:  
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Nguyễn Thị Hạnh?Associate Professor, Faculty of History, Hanoi University of Pedagogy
Introduction
The Second World War and its consequences have had a significant impact on the thinking of military 
and political experts regarding the geopolitical importance of Asia-Pacific in general and Southeast Asia 
in particular. In their assessments, the experts have always paid much attention to the changing balance 
of naval and maritime power. During the first decades of the 20th century, Japanese leaders were 
concerned about maritime interests, as a part of their political agenda to establish an influential empire 
in Asia. The islands in the South China Sea, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands, were among their 
targets. However, concerning this sea territory, Japan had two rivals, France and China. Based on the 
relatively abundant French materials, this paper aims at clarifying the territorial dispute in the Spratlys 
and Paracels among Japan, France and China. Existing studies have mainly focused on the relations 
between France and China and have not paid enough attention to the Japanese role in this dispute. This 
paper attempts to make a more balanced analysis of the complex relations among the three powers.
1. Japan?France?China and the Spratly and Paracel Islands before and during the Second 
World War
On June 6, 1884, the Patenôtre Treaty was signed between France and the Hue imperial court, by 
which Vietnam oﬃcially became a colony of France. France not only colonized Vietnam but other Indo-
chinese countries, and also tried to expand its hegemonic power elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, 
including China. Japan on the other hand spared no eﬀort to compete with France and remove China?s 
influence. Taking advantage of French and Chinese ignorance of maritime sovereignty, Japan intensified 
its activities in the South China Sea, at the beginning through commercial activities and later through 
more brutal actions.
Paracel Islands
During the 1920s, fully aware of the importance of the South China Sea from both a commercial 
and a military point of view, Japan asked France for permission to exploit natural resources around the 
Paracel Islands. An ambiguous response from France, which made no substantive territorial claims 
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over these islands, paved the way for Japan to realize its ambition.1 However, this Japanese action 
worried both France and China. In 1928, the authorities in Hainan sent a patrol boat to the Paracels 
and claimed Chinese sovereignty over them. In response, the Indochina Governor-General sent a 
report to the Minister of the Colonies, suggesting that ?it is time for us to take these islands and claim 
our territorial sovereignty on the basis of both historical evidence and reality.?2 In February 1937, 
France sent the cruiser La Motte-Picquet to investigate the Paracels. A few months later, in October, 
France sent a mission to the islands and erected a lighthouse on Île Pattle for the purpose of claiming 
its sovereignty.
Japan strongly criticized this action, however, and by 1938 ?the Paracel Islands issue? was really 
?internationalized.? In that year, Japan sent its forces to occupy Woody Island (Ile Boisée), thus begin-
ning its expansion and sovereignty claim over the islands. In response, France took a series of actions 
to claim Vietnamese (and thus French) sovereignty over the Paracels. In March 1938, the French ship 
Marne erected many markers of sovereignty in the archipelago.3 In July, the General Government of 
Indochina sent its forces to occupy several of its islands.
Tokyo protested in strong terms. On July 8 1938, the Japanese representatives sent a note to 
complaint about the deployment of French troops to the Paracel Islands, and insisted that France had 
no sovereignty there. The note argued as follows:
First, ?In 1920, Japan sent a message to the Indochina authorities to inquire about sovereignty 
over the Paracels, because Japan intended to investigate the natural resources there. 
Governor-General Roumé said that the Paracels had never been under French sovereignty.?
Second, ?In 1921, the Canton authorities [i.e., the Guomindang government under Sun Yat-Sen] 
issued a decree to annex the Paracels under the management of the Hainanese authorities.?4
The second reason was particularly important for Japan, because Hainan Island would become a target for 
occupation in the not so distant future. By this point Japan was already at war with China. Emperor Hiro-
hito and Prime Minister Konoye issued many statements concerning the war, which indirectly threatened 
the Western nations? interests. One of the Emperor?s declarations emphasized ?the need to fully mobilize 
national resources for the war,? while congratulating the Japanese for the taking of Nanjing.5
The French replied that all the arguments made by Japan were just a sophism aiming for achieving 
diﬀerent objectives, namely to threaten the Chinese government, and to send a warning to Western 
 1 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Indochine, Gouvernement Général de l?Indochine, Direction des Aﬀaires Politiques et Indigènes, 
Note dated 6 May 1921.
 2 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Indochine, Rapport du Gouverneur Général de l?Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, Service 
des Aﬀaires Extérieures, 17 December 1928.
 3 MFD, SHM, La Marine française en Indochine (1939?1955), Marine Nationale, Travail établi d?après les Archives de la Marine 
et rédigé par le Capitaine de Vaisseau (R) Michel Jaques du Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes, tome II.
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nations, especially France, which still maintained normal relations with China. France was the primary 
target of the Japanese threats, because ?it was included in the overall strategy of the Axis, a total assault 
against France.? At any rate, the French considered that ?had it been territorial disputes in the Paracel 
Islands, they would have been primarily between Vietnam and China. Japan had nothing to do with 
this issue.?6
During that period, the Western media published many stories about the ?Paracel issue.? The German 
and Italian press bitterly accused France of violating Japanese sovereignty, while other Western media 
were supportive of France. On July 12, 1938, the Dōmei News Agency accused France of sending six 
warships to the Paracels carrying a large amount of arms, equipment and provisions to prepare for war. 
The Agency also cited news from Hong Kong to confirm this information.7 France completely denied 
this accusation, saying that the warships were not sent as a means to stir up conflict in the Paracels. It 
further argued that this was but a scheme of Japan to provoke and disrupt the relationship between 
France and China. The above events all suggest that the Paracel issue was no longer a ?territorial? dispute 
between the various parties but a pretext used by Japan in its expansionist eﬀorts in Asia.
Meanwhile, China was in a desperate position?invaded by Japan, but unable to strengthen its rela-
tions with France. On July 10, 1938, two days after Japan oﬃcially sent its protest to France, China 
expressed its own position over the Paracels. Chinese Ambassador to Paris Wellington Koo spoke to 
French Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Georges Bonnet about China?s territorial claim over the islands. 
China?s perspective, said Koo, was that ?as far as the current situation is concerned, the presence of 
France in the Paracels is far better than a Japanese occupation, but China still retains its opposition to 
France?s ownership of the Paracel Islands.?8 Bonnet replied that sovereignty over the Paracels belonged 
to Vietnam (which was represented by France) and that the French presence on the islands was an 
indispensable means of protecting this sovereignty. In July 1939, the French government decided to 
annex the Paracels and incorporate them into Thừa Thiên province of Annam.
After the Asia-Pacific War broke out, the South China Sea and its islands, especially the Paracels and 
Spratlys, became strategically important. In particular, the Paracels lay at the entrance to the Sea. One 
French document in 1939 wrote:
We, especially the naval forces, cannot aﬀord to let the Paracel Islands be occupied by another 
power as a base. This would allow the naval forces of big powers to conduct new operations in the 
South China Sea. We have to strongly relate this issue to our national defense and security.9
With this same objective, however, Japan also sent forces to the Paracels in 1939 and declared their 
annexation, intending to use them for military purposes.
 6 Ibid.
 7 « Les Îles Paracelles n?ont jamais reçu de matériel de guerre », Le Jour, 13 July 1938.
 8 Note dated 11 August 1938.
 9 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Chine, Paracels (1946?1947), Note n? 326, 25 April 1939.
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The Spratly Islands
As for the Spratly Islands, during the 1930s, the presence of Japanese fishing boats increased. Japan 
had two purposes: one was economic and another was more strategic for an overall conquest of the 
Asia-Pacific. Anticipating a possible conflict, the French responded immediately. In April 1930, they 
sent a patrol boat to Île de Tempête to erect flags and markers and declare French sovereignty.10 In July 
1933, in the Oﬃcial Journal of the French Republic, they published a list of islands, including the 
Spratly archipelago, to which French forces had been and over which they now declared their sover-
eignty.11 This action encountered Japanese opposition. In this context, the two sides decided to use 
diplomatic negotiations for settlement. A series of talks were held in Tokyo and Paris from 1933 to 
1935, but without any substantive results.
In August 1937, right after the outbreak of the Sino?Japanese War, Tokyo sought to resume negotia-
tions with France. However, the French did not accept this oﬀer, and instead brought the case for inter-
national arbitration. The Japanese rejected this suggestion On March 30, 1939, after occupying Hainan, 
the Tokyo government decided to annex both the Spratlys and Paracels and place them under the 
management of the Japanese authorities in Taiwan. Japan combined the two groups of islands and 
named them ?Shinnan Gunto? (New South Archipelagoes). The next day Foreign Minister M. Sawada 
met with French Ambassador Arsène-Henry to convey his government?s decision. Sawada claimed 
that the Japanese ?were the first to send patrol boats around the Spratly Islands in 1917 and since then 
these islands had been ?without any owner? (sans possesseurs).?12 On the same day, the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs released an oﬃcial announcement to confirm this annexation. This was 
without a doubt a calculated move by Japan before the eruption of the Second World War.
The French were quick to oppose this move. On April 6 Arsène-Henry sent a note of protest to the 
Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs.13 France also began a series of protests through the press and called on its 
allies to step in. France particularly expected a positive response from the British government, as 
according to their documents, the British were the first visitors to the Spratlys. The western group of 
the islands had been discovered and mapped by the British ship Rifleman. As for the eastern group of 
islands, due to frequent storms and many dangerous reefs, Western ships rarely visited this ?dangerous 
zone.? At any rate, the British had never made any territorial claims over those islands.
According to the reports published by the French press, Britain sent a telegram to oppose the Japa-
nese occupation and annexation of the Spratlys and Paracels on the grounds that these actions violated 
Britain?s territorial sovereignty in the Far East.14 On April 6, during hearings in Parliament, represen-
tatives of the Foreign Ministry also expressed their support for France. However, the British did not 
10 FR_CAOM, Fonds Indochine, Agence F.O.M., volume 285, les îles Spratleys 1939.
11 MAE, « Avis relatif à l?occupation de certaines îles par des unités navales françaises », Journal Oﬃciel de la République 
française, n? 173, 26 July 1933, p. 7837.
12 « Le Japon aux îles de la Tempête possessions françaises », L?Ere Nouvelle, 4 April 1939.
13 « La France proteste oﬃciellement à Tokio contre l?annexion des Îles Spratly », L?Epoque, 7 April 1939.
14 Revue de presse étrangère, « Autour de la question des Spratleys », 5 April 1939, N. 210
?     ?
Nguyễn ị Hạnh
88
take any substantial action on this issue, since they were still maintaining a conciliatory attitude 
toward Japan. London and Tokyo had just concluded an agreement on tariﬀs whose contents might 
have been unfavorable to China.15 In general, the British still maintained a ?supportive? policy towards 
the Japanese until they went to war.
Until the end of 1940, French archival documents often show the presence of dispersed groups of 
French soldiers in the islands, including cases where they were stationed near Japanese soldiers on 
another island. However, after 1941, no such documentary evidence is found. In the meantime, French 
sources also show that Japanese forces occupied some important atolls in the Paracels and used them 
as bases to support their submarines during the war.
Thus, the Japanese southward maritime expansion started with the annexation of Taiwan and then 
the occupation of Hainan, eventually reaching the islands in the South China Sea.
2. Japan?France?China and the Spratlys and Paracels issue after the Second World War
The conflicts during the Asia-Pacific War reminded the concerned parties of the strategic impor-
tance of the South China Sea. Japan was defeated and forced to sign a series of treaties covering territo-
rial issues, including the Spratlys and Paracels. Japan renounced its claims over the archipelagoes. 
However, the territorial disputes there did not end, but rather became more and more complicated.16
The South China Sea issue seen through the Treaty of San Francisco (1951)
On September 8, 1951 the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied 
nations to oﬃcially terminate the War. This marked the end of Japan as a great power. In the Treaty, 
Japan oﬃcially announced its renunciation of sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels, but did not 
specify who would inherit this sovereignty. Section F, Article 2, Chapter II on Territory simply stated: 
?Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.?17 This 
development began new conflicts and made the settlement of territorial disputes even more diﬃcult.
The People?s Republic of China was not satisfied with the provisions in the Treaty of San Francisco, 
especially those regarding territory. In fact, the Treaty was signed on the basis of a draft made by the 
US and England. China argued as follows:
?  The draft ?violat[ed] its territorial rights in not only Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) but also in the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands? as the draft made no reference to returning these territories to China.
?  Furthermore, China accused the US of wilful ignorance of China?s indisputable ownership over 
some islands; claiming that France and the US had a ?secret understanding? with regards to the 
settlement of the Spratlys and Paracels issue, which paved the way for France to occupy the ar-
chipelagoes.
15 « L?occupation des iles Spratly », Action Française, 7 April 1939.
16 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Chine, vol. 214, Paracels (1944?1955), ?L?archipel des Paracels, avant-garde de la mer du Sud,? article 
spécial publié par Chen Pao [Shenbao], 27 January 1946.
17 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Chine, vol. 213, « Les îles Spratley, Pékin-23/8?Agence Hsinhua », telegram from French Embassy in 
China, Shanghai, 8 September 1951.
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?  To justify its accusation, China cited a speech by Foster Dulles on March 3, 1951 at the Whittier In-
stitute in California. The speech referred to the American standpoint on sovereignty over the Pacific 
islands: ?The US cannot aﬀord to let these islands fall into the hands of Chinese communists.?18
?  China added that Article 2 of Section F was inserted in the last draft by England and the US on 
July 12, 1951, while the previous draft announced in April 1951 contained no such provision. In 
addition, immediately following the announcement of the Draft, on July 20th, 1951, the French 
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs declared that ?The contents of the Draft, especially the provisions re-
lated to territories, are in complete conformance with the position of the French government. 
They confirm the sovereignty of France over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.?
China viewed a visit by J. Foster Dulles to Paris in the middle of June 1951 as a step to negotiate with 
the French government over a number of concessions granted to France in Indochina, in return for 
which France would endorse the provisions of the Treaty that were favorable to the US and Japan.19 To 
further emphasize its standpoint, on August 15, 1951 and September 28, 1951, Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀairs Zhou Enlai released a series of responses of the Chinese government to oppose the San 
Francisco Treaty and stated: ?Every treaty related to China in which China had no participation is 
considered illegal and invalid.?20
The accusations made by China, although not groundless, were not accepted by France and other 
nations. Refuting the Chinese claims, France reaﬃrmed its undeniable sovereignty over the islands, 
saying that the renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over these islands was not even necessary. A report 
by the French Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs on March 24, 1950 on the issue of the Spratly Islands wrote:
1.? To avoid unnecessary problems regarding territorial claims by a great power that may arise, 
France has decided to reaﬃrm its sovereignty using diﬀerent approaches: deploying naval 
forces, reconstructing garrisons, replacing markers damaged during the war, releasing oﬃcial 
statements, etc.
2.? It is not necessary to wait for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. We [the French] have 
never accepted Japan?s sovereignty, and therefore, have no need to wait for them [the Japanese] 
to make a declaration, and also have no need to ask for them to renounce what has always be-
longed to us. Every provision in the Treaty is only to prevent the ambition of Japan??21
At the San Francisco Conference on September 7, 1951, Trần Văn Hưu, Prime Minister of the 
French-sponsored State of Vietnam, made a claim for the historical sovereignty of Vietnam over the 
Spratlys and Paracels.22 At the same time, the Spratlys became a concern not only for France and 
China, but also for the Philippines, which was supported by the US, and possibly for also England. In 
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 François Joyaux, La nouvelle question d?Extrême?Orient, tome II, Frontières et stratégies (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1991), p. 98.
21 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Note du 24 mai 1950 sur les îles Spratly.
22 « La déclaration du Premier Ministre du Vietnam à la Conférence de San Francisco (7/9/1951) », Revue ?France-Asie?, n? 66?
67, Dec. 1951, pp. 502?505.
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1951, England sent a patrol ship to take photographs and perform field investigations in the area 
around the Spratlys.23
The South China Sea issue in the Sino?Japanese Peace Treaty 1952
On April 28, 1952, seven years after the end of the Second World War, Japan and the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) concluded the Sino?Japanese Peace Treaty, oﬃcially putting an end to their conflict. 
However, the inclusion of the Spratlys and Paracels in this Treaty once again spurred disputes between 
France, the People?s Republic of China, and Japan.
Article 2 of the Sino?Japanese Peace Treaty adopted Sections B and F of Article 2 of the San Fran-
cisco Treaty to state the renunciation of ?all right, title and claim to the territories of Taiwan, Penghu, 
the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.?24 The French immediately expressed their disagreement to 
the Japanese government. On May 7, 1952, the French Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs sent a telegram to 
French Ambassador to Japan, in which he indicated:
This seems to be a ?secret endorsement? for Chinese ambitions over these territories because these 
territories are only mentioned in a bilateral Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China only. 
We would like to wait for the oﬃcial announcement and the unfolding of events to decide on how 
to solve this matter. Our policy is to send an oﬃcial protest to the Japanese government depend-
ing on circumstances.?25
The Japanese, in response to the French protest, delivered an explanation of the reason why they 
included both Sections B and F of Article 2 in the 1952 bilateral treaty. They argued that this provision 
was simply ?a reiteration of the provision on territory in the San Francisco Treaty and [that] Japan only 
aimed at making its oﬃcial renunciation of sovereignty, without any suggestion as to whom these 
territories would belong in the present or how this issue would be solved.?26 In a report dated May 13, 
1952 sent by French Ambassador de Jean to his Ministry in Paris, he commented on the Japanese 
explanation as follows:
The first draft submitted by the delegation of Japan to the delegation of Republic of China only men-
tioned Taiwan and Penghu in Article 2. However, the representatives of Taiwan insisted on adding 
the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The result was that Japan had to concede. However, the objective of 
both the Japanese negotiation team and their government was to reaﬃrm the renunciation of these 
territories by Japan without any mention of their present and future owners. As for the Spratly and 
Paracel Islands, the delegation of Japan also thoroughly explained their idea to the Taiwanese side.?27
23 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Telegram from French Consul General in Singapore to Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, 11 February 1952.
24 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Telegram from Dejean, French Ambassador in Tokyo, 13 Mai 1952.
25 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Asie-Océanie (1944?1955), Chine, Letter from Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, 7 May 1952.
26 Document cited in note 27.
27 Ibid. 
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On May 21, the French Ambassador to Japan sent a telegram to Saigon to report his conversation 
with the Japanese Foreign Minister: ?The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan aﬃrmed that Article 2 of 
the Sino?China Peace Treaty was simply an adoption of Article 2 in the San Francisco Treaty in its 
original sense, without any other hint or suggestion.?28 However, the Japanese did not want to 
displease the Republic of China, so Japan?s Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs asked the French to minimize 
the broad publication of his explanation. If the French wished to publicize it, this should be done only 
within Paris.
The Chinese argued that, due to the bilateral nature of the Sino?Japanese Peace Treaty, its contents 
related to Japan and the Republic of China only. Moreover, according to the Treaty, Japan agreed to 
return not only Taiwan, Penghu but also the Spratlys and Paracels to China. The French disagreed with 
this argument, insisting that Japan?s earlier rejection of French sovereignty over the Spratlys annex-
ation of the archipelago had not received support from other great powers, even China.29
At this moment, the issue became further irresolvable as too many parties were involved, namely 
France (representing Vietnam), Japan, the People?s Republic of China, and the Republic of China. Each 
party retained its own standpoint and hence the legal disputes stretched over many decades with a lot 
of ups and downs. The already diﬃcult issue of the Spratlys and Paracels became even more compli-
cated in later years.
Conclusion
In general, it can be said that during the Second World War, the the Spratly and Paracel issue 
extended beyond traditional territorial disputes and became ?internationalized? by Japan and the Axis. 
Sovereignty over the archipelagoes during the war became an instrument for Japan to further its expan-
sion in Asia. Despite its brief presence in the islands (1938?45), Japan?s wartime territorial claim over 
them and the related provisions in the postwar treaties with the Allied nations and China on the other 
complicated the issue more than ever. As with other issues concerning the Second World War, the 
wartime territorial conflict over the Spratlys and Paracels was exploited by concerned parties to take 
over these islands, to see their rivals? reactions, and even to ?bargain? or ?negotiate? for their interests.
As shown in this paper, it can be said that France, both before and after the war, whether powerful 
or weakened, attached a high importance to the issues related to Indochina and to sovereignty over the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands in particular. As for Vietnam, despite its subordination to the French for a 
long time, it has never ceased or suspended the justification, implementation and protection of its 
sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels.
28 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Telegram from Tokyo to Saigon, 21 May 1952.
29 MAE, ASIE-OCEANIE, Chine (1944?1955), Spratly (juillet 1946), vol. 213, Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs to 
Secretary General, Comité de l?Indochine, 21 September 1946.
